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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
agreement was the placing on deposit of $5,000 out of which the
defendant bank could have indemnified itself if the correspondent
bank had withdrawn some of the $5,000 advanced to it to cover a
loss from a change in the rate of exchange. Therefore, if the bank
was holding the money for its own benefit there was no trust and
consequently no possibility of a preference. 24 If the defendant
bank had been holding the money for the purpose of forwarding it
to the correspondent bank and thus for the benefit of the correspondent bank, the creation of a trust would have been possible.
FRANK T. ROSENQUIST.
THE TORT LIABILITY OF USERS OF ABANDONED
PROPERTY
A question which from the standpoint of decisions is seemingly
unique was raised in the case of Locke v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al, 78 Wash. Dec. 40, 33 Pac. (2d) 1077 (1934),
concerning the liability of users of abandoned property The city
of Seattle erected a pole in 1905 on a parking strip bordering one
of its streets, for the purpose of carrying the wires of the city's
light plant. In 1926 the city removed all of its wires from the
pole, and shortly thereafter the defendant telephone company
placed a single drop wire on the pole which ran from their main
line to the house of a subscriber in front of which the pole stood.
This single wire remained on the pole until 1932 when the pole,
because of its old and decayed condition, fell across the street
and was struck by the plaintiff's auto without any fault on his
part. The telephone company was a mere trespasser on the pole,
and its drop wire was not a cause of the accident. In an action
brought by the plaintiff for personal injuries against the city of
Seattle and the telephone company a jury verdict was given in
favor of the plaintiff against both defendants, judgment was
entered against the city, and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted in favor of the telephone company Both the plaintiff and the city appeal from the granting
of this motion in favor of the telephone company It was held
that the defendant telephone company did not have such control
over the pole as to create the affirmative duty to inspect and repair
running to the public, and that in fact they had no legal right
to repair or to remove the pole, and hence were not liable. There
is a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Beals in whose opinion the
control exercised by the telephone company was sufficient to create
such a duty
It seems conceded that control over the property in question is
the basis of the duty to inspect and repair, and the fact of the
sufficiency of the control exercised in this case is the point upon
which the court splits. However, the second reason advanced by
the majority for their decision is entirely inconsistent with a mere
" Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 111 (5) provides that the

sole trustee of a trust cannot be the sole beneficiary of the trust.
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trespasser ever exercising sufficient control to create such a duty
because it would be impossible for a trespasser to attain the right
to repair. Thus in the case of wrongful control there are but two
alternatives. Either such control may never be sufficient to create
a duty to inspect and repair because of the absence of the right to
repair, which right is absent solely because the control exercised
is wrongful, or that control is the sole basis of the duty, and, since
the absence of the right to repair is due only to the wrongful
way in which the control was gained, it is no defence for the nonperformance of the duty This, of course, raises the question as
to what is the real basis of the duty and the liability for its breach.
In the case of lawful control over property where the control is
sufficient to create the duty to repair, the right to repair is also
always present because it arises from the nature of the control
which creates the duty. In the case of a trespasser, however, it is
obvious that no such right can arise from his control, if any he
has, because the control exercised by him is itself wrongful. Thus
it appears that the right to make the repairs is only a constant
derivative of the lawful control which creates the duty to make
the repairs-the duty being determined solely by the sufficiency
of that control, and that for this reason the right, in cases where
the control is unlawful, should not be controlling because its absence is due only to the unlawful character of the control and not
to the sufficiency thereof.
Assuming, then, that control is the sole basis of the duty to
inspect and repair, it still appears that, in the view of the majority
of the court, a trespasser could never attain sufficient control over
property to create liability for inherent defects or for any accident arising from the property that did not spring from its use,
for it is difficult to see how the control of a mere trespasser could
be more complete than it is in this case.
That complete control over property when such control is legally
gamed will be sufficient to create a duty even when it is not
coupled with an interest in the property itself, is demonstrated by
the liability of agents to injured parties for failure to inspect and
repair when the agent is in complete control. In Lough v. John
Davis & Co., 30 Wash. 204, 70 Pac. 491 (1902), the defendant as
agent for the owner of a certain building was given absolute and
complete control over the building by the owner. The plaintiff
fell from the veranda of this building because of the negligence of
the defendant in not repairing it when it became rotten from old
age. The defendant was held liable directly to the plaintiff without
joining the owner in the suit. It was contended by the defendant
that his only duty was one of contract to the owner, and that as
he had no interest in the building, he had no duty running to the
public who were not privy to the contract, but the court said.
"
the obligation, whether for misfeasance or nonfeasance, does not rest in contract at all, but is a common-law
obligation devolving upon every responsible person to so
use that which he controls as not to injure another,
whether he is in the operation of his own property as
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principal or in the operation of the property of another as
agent. "
Of the two cases cited in the opinion of the Locke case (which
the court admits is the extent of the authority on the point) only
one of them concerns the liability of a trespasser. In that case
the defendant power company placed a beam in the forks of a
tree standing on the property of the plaintiff to which they attached a guy wire for the purpose of supporting one of the poles
in their power line. Later a dead branch much higher up in the
tree fell and injured the plaintiff. It was conceded that the beam
and guy wire had nothing to do with causing the branch to fall,
but that the branch died for some unknown reason and fell from
its own weight. The court held that the defendant power company was not liable and had no duty to inspect and make safe.
The theory of the plaintiff that the defendant had incorporated
the tree in its system of poles was entirely discarded by the court
which held substantially the same as the Locke case, saying that
the defendant had no such control over the tree as to create a duty
running to the plaintiff, and that in fact they had no right to
repair the tree. Pwculjan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co.,
207 Mo. App. 331, 234 S. W 1006 (1921)
In this case no importance was attached to the fact that the
plaintiff owned the tree. A hypothetical case was put by the
court in their opinion Suppose a politician was running for office
and nailed some posters on the side of an abandoned barn, and
that later the barn fell and injured a passer-by because of some
inherent defect in its construction. Would the politician be liable9
The answer is of course in the negative.
But if the liability is based on control, it could easily be argued
that even though the politician had obtained a legal right by
license to use the wall of the barn for this purpose, still he would
not have had sufficient control over the entire barn to be liable
for its falling on the plaintiff. This is shown by the cases where
such actual license has been granted. In Reynolds v. Van Beuren,
155 N. Y 120, 49 N. E. 763 (1898), the defendant had acquired
the use of a sign board on the roof of a certain building from the
tenant of the building. The sign, because of an inherent defect in
its construction, fell on the plaintiff as he walked on the street
below The court first construed the license as granting only the
use of the sign for a specific purpose vis., to display advertisements, and they further construed a promise in the license to
keep the roof in repair as merely applying to the damage that
the licensee might do by walking on the roof in the placing of his
advertisements. They then held that since the control over the
sign was only granted to the defendant for the sole purpose of
displaying his advertisements, that all the remaining control was
retained by the tenant of the building who was solely liable for
the accident if anyone was.
In cases of this kind the control over the property is definitely
set out in the instrument which grants it, and thus the duties aris-
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ing from the control are definitely established. But in the ease
of a trespasser it must either be said that he exercises no control
whatever, or that his overt acts must be taken to indicate the
amount of control which in fact he is exercismg--even though
such control is entirely wrongful.
Applying this to the politician, it would take a large stretch of
inagination to say that the act of posting a sign on the side of
a barn would indicate an assumption of control over the entire
barn either in fact or by intent. So too the tree might be susceptible to this argument, although it would admittedly be a very
close question of fact. When we come, however, to a telephone
pole this argument would fail, for such a pole has only one purpose and that is to carry wires, and thus one who places his wires
on the pole has exercised almost the extent of the control possible.
Even a partial user of the poles and wires of a system has been
held to constitute sufficient control to impose the duty of inspection and repair when the use was gained legally In Roberts v.
Pacific Gas & Electrzc Co., 102 Cal. App. 422, 283 Pac. 353 (1929),
the defendant electric company constructed a line for the city
which consisted of poles and wires running to and serving the
city's park. By the contract of construction the city was to become
the sole owner of the line but the defendant reserved the right to
use the line for the purpose of serving one golf club with power.
A tree fell over the line forcing the wires almost to the ground but
not breaking them, and they remained in that condition for about
a month. The deceased, not seeing the wires, attempted to cut
the tree for fire wood and was electrocuted. It was held that the
partial use retained was enough to impose the duty to inspect and
repair on the defendant, and that thus it was liable.
And also in North Arkansas Telephwne Co. et al v. Peters, 103
Ark. 564, 148 S. W 273 (1912), the defendant telephone company
had constructed a line to the city limits. A subscriber, who lived
four miles beyond the city limits constructed a line to the city
limits where the wires connected with those of the telephone company Neither the subscriber nor the defendant ever inspected the
line, but when it was found to be out of order or it was reported
to the subscriber that the wires were down, he would notify the
defendant who would send a repairman out at its own convenience
to repair the line. The plaintiff was injured due to a sagging wire
on the portion of the line owned and constructed by the subscriber.
It was held that the defendant operated the line and that it was
constructed for the joint benefit of the subscriber and the defendant, and that thus the defendant had sufficient control to
create a duty to inspect and repair, and for that reason was liable.
In the above cases the amount of control necessary to create the
duty to inspect and repair is determined directly from the use, and
the only difference between them and the Locke case is the difference between legal and illegal use, or in other words the fact that
the control was exercised with the consent of the legal owners.
For this reason it seems that a trespasser in the view of the Locke
case is incapable of exercising such control over property tres-
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passed on as to create a duty in him to inspect and repair the
property This conclusion is strengthened by the argument of the
court that the trespasser had no legal right to repair or remove the
pole-for a trespasser could never attain such legal right and still
be a trespasser. Thus whether the view is taken that a trespasser
cannot be charged with such a duty because more than actual
control alone is required to create it, or whether it is accepted
that control ss the sole basis of the duty but that in the case of a
trespasser such duty is always defeated by the absence of the right
to perform it, still the fact remains that the only reason for nonliability is the wrongful character of the control exercised by the
trespasser. In the Locke case a trespasser of long standing-who
is a wrongdoer-is placed in a vastly better position than the conscientious user of property who obtains the right to use the property from the owner. Thus the trespasser profits from his own
wrongful act and escapes liability solely because of it, for had he
obtained the right to use the pole from the city before placing his
wires upon it, he would have been liable. A better solution of
the problem would be to recognize that the actual control exercised
is the basis and measure of the duty to inspect and repair regardless of whether such control is legally gained or not.
As has been mentioned above, this is a question on which
authority virtually does not exist, and it is submitted that the
case should have been decided in view of more fundamental
principles than those advanced either by court or counsel. The
cases which hold that a person should never be allowed to set up
the results of his own wrongful acts as a defence to liability, or
that he should not be allowed to profit by virtue of having committed those wrongful acts, are found in numbers in all fields of
the law and are far too numerous and well recognized to necessitate mentioning here.
JAMES W

JOHNSTON.

